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Formal semantics and functional semantics
Peter Widell 
Aarhus Universitet
Peter Harder
Københavns Universitet
Abstract
This joint article represents an attempt to clarify relations between two 
rather different approaches to the description of linguistic meaning: truth-
conditional semantics (as represented by Peter Widell) and functional 
semantics (as represented by Peter Harder). The two approaches are 
anchored in different traditions, are based on different theoretical premises, 
and have different objectives. Truth-conditional semantics is based on 
a philosophical tradition with strong relations to logic, while functional 
semantics is based on a linguistic tradition with borrowings from 
evolutionary biology (and also from speech acts philosophy). We argue that 
an integrated picture that accommodates both approaches can be achieved 
by a mutual recognition of the different aims as well as of a central area in 
which the different aims give rise to compatible insights about linguistic 
meaning. 
I. The formal approach
1. Introduction
The concept of (linguistic) meaning remains diffi cult to explain and
understand in a consensual way. Ever since antiquity it has been the subject
of intensive inquiry. The most familiar and infl uential discussion is the
one based on Plato’s doctrine of ideas or forms, as mentioned for example
in his Republic, book 7. Here, the view is expressed that the reason why
we can use the word cow (our example) to refer to different cows is that
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all cows ’participate’ (as Plato says) in the same cow-meaning (= idea or 
form). According to Plato, this entails that the idea must have independent 
existence apart from the different instantiations, in a realm of ideas 
beyond the world of sense impressions. A different proposal goes back to 
the empiricist philosopher John Locke, who suggests that the conceptual 
meaning of a word must be found as an idea or mental representation in the 
mind of the person who uses the word. 
 Many have been dissatisfi ed with both explanations, and proposals 
for alternatives have been put forward throughout the twentieth century. 
Two suggestions from the beginning of the century have been especially 
infl uential; both try to defi ne their way out of the problems. 
 One is due to structuralism in the Saussurean tradition. The core idea is 
that linguistic meaning is viewed as a by-product of structural relations in 
the specifi c language to which the words and sentences belong, cf. Saussure 
(1983 [1916]). Meaning is thus defi ned in a purely language-immanent 
way as emerging from a system of differences between linguistic signs.
 The other proposal we fi nd within analytical philosophy. Here, meaning 
is defi ned with the help of logic, based on the concept of truth. (Conceptual) 
meaning is simply understood as those conditions in the world that make 
sentences in language true or false. 
 There are certain parallel views of the nature of language within the 
traditions of structuralism and analytical philosophy. For instance, the notion 
of ’implicit defi nition’ in Hilbert (1899) and the syntactic understanding 
of logic in Rudolf Carnap (2000 [1934]) have striking similarities with 
the immanent view based on sign differences in Saussure. Nevertheless, 
there has been little interaction between the two sets of views – although 
in a Danish context, Hjelmslev tried (with unfortunate consequences, cf. 
Harder 1974) to introduce notions from logical positivism into his view 
of the foundations of linguistics, spurred on by parallel ideas about the 
autonomy of formal description.
 In recent decades, however, the linguistic tradition has developed 
beyond the purely relational approach in classical structuralism. 
Internationally, this is manifested in cognitive linguistics (in the traditions 
of George Lakoff and Ronald Langacker), and in functionalist traditions 
of different types, including those of Dik (1989), Givón (1993), Foley & 
Van Valin (1984) and others. Truth-conditional semantics has similarly 
expanded to include dimensions of meaning traditionally associated with 
the pragmatics of communication, cf. e.g. Sperber & Wilson (1986), 
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Carston (1988) and Recanati (1989) on semantic underdeterminacy of 
propositional content and Rooth (1992) on focus assignment. 
 In Denmark, there has been a development whereby certain key notions 
from European structuralism have been integrated in a functional approach 
to linguistic description (cf. Engberg-Pedersen et al. 1996). The move 
beyond classical structuralism consists, briefl y speaking, in recognizing 
that meanings have a positive content – which enables them to function in 
communication – while also having structural relations between them. The 
positive content motivates both the speaker’s choices (when she uses the 
word cow instead of horse, for instance), and also structural distinctions. 
The ancient assumption that the grammatical category of substantives 
refl ected the metaphysical category of substances was proved wrong by 
structuralism, but there is a motivating relationship that goes in the other 
direction, cf. Lyons (1966): all physical objects like stone are denoted by 
nouns rather than verbs. 
 Some insights from structuralism continue to be valid, because 
structures cannot be fully derived from functional properties, and thus have 
a (partial) life of their own, cf. Harder (1999). The important point in this 
context is that language, in this approach as opposed to uncompromising 
structuralism, has relations with the world outside purely structural 
relations.
 This has provided a footing on which it becomes possible to explore 
mutual relations between the two approaches in the title. This opportunity we 
would like to take in this article, with Peter Widell taking the perspective of 
formal semantics and Peter Harder the perspective of functional semantics. 
While this does not directly address the focal research interests of Sten 
Vikner, we hope that the discussion below will represent a contribution 
to the fruitful possibility of dialogue across disciplinary frontiers that is 
manifested in the broad scope of contributors to this volume.
 Our main suggestion is that the two approaches to meaning do 
not directly contradict one another, but rather could be viewed as 
complementing one another by asking important but different questions 
about language and meaning. The focal concerns of the two approaches 
fi nd their answers in different, but interconnected areas of language. While 
formal semantics takes its point of departure in truth conditions associated 
with the propositional core, functional semantics takes its point of departure 
in the communicative anchoring of linguistic signs in human interaction, 
ultimately drawing on evolutionary foundations. 
Formal semantics and functional semantics
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 A word of warning: Because the point of the paper is to establish a 
platform on which the two approaches can meet, most of what is said about 
each of the two approaches below will be very fundamental. By purposely 
limiting ourselves to the basics, we hope to give an accessible view of the 
common playing fi eld that is otherwise not easily discernible.
 Although we focus on different analytic tasks, there is an essential 
meeting point in the form of the assertion. We see the assertion as the core 
functional category, which at the same time provides the setting for the 
proposition with its truth-based relation to the world, and also constitutes 
the key functional innovation of human language. Although assertive 
statements about what is the case are one among other types of functional 
contributions to human interaction as pointed out by Wittgenstein (1953), 
the capacity to interact by way of exchanging propositional information 
is an essential part of what makes human language unique. The account 
therefore aims to transcend the traditional association between ‘function’ 
and pre-linguistic relations (on the one hand) and ‘logic’ and purely formal-
mathematical aspects of meaning. Based on this recognition, Peter Widell 
(in the fi rst half of the paper) will work from the assertion towards the 
proposition and its truth conditions, while Peter Harder (in the second half 
of the paper) will work from the assertion towards its links with interactive 
aspects of meaning.
2. Formal semantics: Conceptual, linguistic meaning = truth 
conditions
Language is a means of communication. But it must also have an anchoring 
in the world: linguistic utterances have – as the basic, canonical case – to 
be TRUE of the facts we fi nd in the world, and this assumption has to be 
a shared feature between participants in communicative events. Otherwise 
language would carry no valid meaning. That is the basic point of departure 
for the theory of meaning on which formal semantics builds. 
 Let us take an example of communication showing what is at stake: A 
watches his neighbour C felling a fi r tree, and subsequently goes to speak 
to B, saying:
 
(1) C is felling a fi r tree
In this case, A’s neighbour must have been engaged in this act (witnessed 
by A), as a condition of A’s utterance being true. In that sense, the linguistic 
sign – the cited sentence – is related to a previously existing situation in the 
Peter Widell & Peter Harder
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world. It is precisely this relation between situation and sentence which 
has been in focus for formal logic and which it is therefore concerned 
to (re)construct and provide with an explicit theoretical form. It is this 
task which has turned out to be in no way simple, on which we will 
concentrate below. 
The German logician and philosopher Gottlob Frege, in his 
Begriffsschrift (1879) has suggested an interesting analogy (which he fully 
developed in an article from 1892) between a sentence like (1) and the 
mathematical notion of function, cf. (2):
(2) y = f(x1,x2, …),
In (2), y corresponds to the sentence (1) C is felling a fi r tree while x1 stands 
for the proper name ”C” referring to the individual object, in this case the 
person C. In turn, x2 stands for a particular fi r tree, and f stands for the 
predicate ”[…] is felling […]”, which is ascribed to respectively C and the 
fi r tree referred to in sentence y. 
The analogy between the sentence and the mathematical function 
directly shows what is at stake in the sentence: the sentence y is not merely 
a juxtaposition or concatenation of the expressions f and the different x’s, 
in the example the felling, C and the fi r tree. The sentence expresses a 
judgement (Frege: Urteil) – i.e., a judgment that the object referred to by 
C is included in the set of objects referred to by the predicate f (of persons 
engaged in tree-felling). This in effect describes a kind of act: to ascribe a 
predicate f to some x’s in fact amounts to making an assertion. 
 The crucial point in Frege’s analysis is that assertions are seen as being 
essential for bringing language into contact with the world and assigning 
meaning to it. Only when a judgment is made are linguistic sentences 
brought into contact with those facts in the world that they concern. And 
only then will it be possible for the proposition expressed by the sentence 
to be true. Language in its abstract form is not the most important thing 
about language – it is the actual use of it in concrete speech situations 
which enables it to express true or false propositions. 
Some assertions, as in example (1) above, are simple, and their 
propositions can be true or false independently of other propositions. Others 
are complex assertions in which the truth values of the whole proposition 
can be systematically calculated by reference to the truth values of the 
simple propositions which they contain. In addition to discovering that 
the sentence can be seen as a function, Frege is acclaimed for having set 
Formal semantics and functional semantics
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up a complete set of rules for calculating the truth value of any complex 
proposition, given the truth values of the constituent’s simple propositions.1 
This system can be found in its full form in logic textbooks under the 
heading ’fi rst-order predicate logic’ (”fi rst-order” because what logic needs 
to refer to in order to avoid paradoxes and contradictions, are things in the 
world, not expressions denoting those things).
Frege’s predicate logic from 1879 is in all ways a masterpiece, which 
virtually all formal semanticists regard as the ultimate canon of logic. 
During the twentieth century, a succession of logical theories arose, but 
they are not alternatives to Fregean logic, but rather special applications 
of his system, which constitutes the only necessary foundational logical 
theory.
Besides 1879 another epoch-marking year is 1905, when Russell 
publishes his article ”On Denoting”. In it, he seeks to provide a more 
precise answer to what happens when we use a particular form of reference 
in language, the type expressed by what came to be known as defi nite 
descriptions like the capital of France. Russell’s point about the use of such 
expressions is that although they are similar in function to proper names, 
they at the same time provide a description of their referent. Unlike Paris, 
which refers to the same city, the capital of France provides a description 
of the object to which it refers. 
Russell believes that this leads to the possibility of contradictions. 
The problem is best known from the account given by the Austrian 
phenomenologist Lexius Meinong (1960 [1899]). The problem is that in 
accounting for statements such as The Golden Mountain does not exist it 
appears that they presuppose the existence of an object whose existence is 
subsequently denied. Meinong himself believes he has found a solution: 
There are two modes of existence, one for ordinary objects and one for 
impossible objects such as the Golden Mountain and the square circle; 
these have according to Meinong a mode of existence called “subsistence”. 
1 It would take us too far to introduce all the rules in Frege’s set of rules. It is not our task 
here to engage in predicate logic. The rules for the so-called quantifi ers should, however, 
be mentioned, namely the rule for use of the existential quantifi er (indicated in bold): 
There exists an x, such that x is P, e.g. There exists an x, such that x is a living creature, 
and the rule for use of the universal quantifi er (indicated in bold): For all x, it is the case 
that x is P, e.g. For all x, it is the case that x is a human being. The reason for mention-
ing the rules is that they represent a simple and elegant completion of predicate logic by 
allowing multiple use of expressions like all and some, e.g. For all x there exists a y, such 
that if x is P, then y is Q. From Aristotle to Kant and Mill logicians have lived in blissful 
ignorance of these rules. That is why logic in their hands has appeared like a torso.
Peter Widell & Peter Harder
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This solution Russell fi nds just as unsatisfactory as the problem it is meant 
to solve – it smacks of Platonic ‘ideas’ or ‘forms’. 
Instead, Russell points to a quite different take on the problem, one 
based on logical analysis. Traditionally the verb exist is viewed, based on 
grammatical criteria, as a predicate. But according to Russell this gives a 
distorted picture. “To exist” does not signify a predicate, but an existential 
quantifi er (cf. note 1). This means that the sentence the Golden Mountain 
does not exist must be re-described as having the following logical form, 
in order to yield a proper description of its meaning: There exists an x, 
where x is a mountain, and x is golden [….]. Under this interpretation, one 
will avoid the problem of existence, and what emerges is simply a false 
sentence: There is something which is a mountain and is golden.
It is important to understand that Russell’s solution does not merely 
apply to impossible examples like the Golden Mountain and square circles. 
The analysis is quite general and applies also to normal cases like the 
capital of France. In addition to existence, the logical form for defi nite 
descriptions also includes the ‘uniqueness’ aspect which distinguishes 
defi nite from indefi nite descriptions (e.g., the capital of France from a 
capital of France), so that there can be only one referent answering to the 
description. A defi nite description can be paraphrased, there is an x which 
is the Capital of France, and if any y is the capital of France, then y = x. 
 The importance of this analysis for the subsequent philosophical 
discussion can hardly be overestimated. It is viewed not only as one of the 
fi rst, but also one of the best examples of conceptual analysis in analytical 
philosophy, illustrating an important innovation in what doing philosophy 
means. What Russell’s analysis shows is how to analyze any sentence in a 
way that factors out a purely referential element (a ‘logical proper name’) 
from the descriptive content (the predicate). According to Russell, the 
combination of these two constitutes the essential meeting place between 
syntax and semantics. 
3. Frege’s necessary correction 
In 1892, i.e. more than ten years before ”On Denoting”, Frege publishes an 
article which puts into question the idea of logical proper names, i.e. proper 
names without descriptive/conceptual content. In contrast to what Russell 
argues in 1905, Frege claims that proper names always have descriptive 
content. In his argument Frege refers to various examples of proper names, 
including a now famous example from astronomy. The example goes: In 
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ancient Mesopotamia two characteristic features of the night sky had been 
noticed. One star was always the fi rst to light up after sunset (which was 
therefore called the Evening Star), while another star was always the last 
to be visible after sunrise (which was therefore called the Morning Star). 
The interesting thing was that it was at one point discovered that they were 
not stars at all, and only one heavenly body was involved, viz. the planet 
we now know as Venus. 
 The point of this example is that on closer inspection it appears to 
demonstrate that in spite of his sophisticated analysis of the proposition, 
Russell is actually wrong and Frege right. In the example we have one 
referent and two descriptions. Venus is present to us in one way in the 
evening and in another way in the morning. But such different ‘ways of 
being given to us’ (Frege: Art des Gegebenseins) are really omnipresent. 
For instance, an equilateral triangle can also be an ‘equi-angular’ triangle. 
And a block can both be a red block and a square block. This means that 
the division into a purely referential and a purely descriptive element 
according to Frege cannot solve the problem that Russell wants to solve. 
You could, as Russell does, argue that a proper name like the Evening Star 
has a hidden descriptive content and is actually also a defi nite description 
separating the referential and the descriptive element. But according to 
Frege even proper names without explicit descriptive content as for instance 
the proper name Paris has a sense according to Frege. 
 It is evident that Russell and Frege cannot both be right at the same 
time. There is, however, a way to solve the problem. Russell and Frege 
are not talking about the exact same thing (a fact under-emphasized 
in the philosophical discussion). Russell talks about language, about 
sentences and their component parts – while Frege basically is not talking 
about linguistic expressions at all. When Frege analyses propositions, he 
sometimes talks about statements, but when he talks in a more focused 
way, he instead talks about ‘thoughts’ (the German word is Gedanke). The 
point is that thoughts do not have to be expressed by a linguistic sentence. 
Frege points this out rather explicitly in a late article, precisely entitled Der 
Gedanke. Here he writes: 
We may distinguish: 1. the apprehension of a thought – thinking; 2. the 
recognition of the truth of a thought – judgment; 3. the manifestation of 
this judgment – assertion (Frege 2008 [1918-1919]: 39). 
Peter Widell & Peter Harder
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Hence, Frege marks a difference between the thought and the expression of 
the thought. Elsewhere in the article he writes, “How does a thought act? 
By being apprehended and taken to be true. This is a process in the inner 
world of a thinker (…)” (Frege 2008 [1918-1919]: 48). In other words: For 
a thought to get expressed by means of language is coincidental. The ‘way 
of being given’ is not in the words, but in the thought itself. 
 This is not to deny that certain more complex thoughts necessarily 
have to piggyback on linguistic formulations. But it means that thoughts 
are inherently capable of coming into being independently of language, 
and also that speech in its early stages probably borrows all of its substance 
– its empirical content – purely from our state of relatedness to the world 
through perception, thinking and action (cf. Makin (2000) for a comment 
on that). To return to Frege’s most famous example: Our awareness of the 
Evening Star is throughout based on that particular ’way of being given’ 
that consists in our perceiving it as a feature of the evening sky.
 This perspective is clearly different from that of linguistic semantics. In 
the radical structuralist version of Saussure as understood by Hjelmslev’s 
‘Copenhagen School’, linguistic meaning was assumed to come into being 
by the combination of a linguistic expression (signifi ant) and a conceptual 
meaning (signifi é) – as organized in an autonomous, immanent linguistic 
system. In contrast, as we can see, according to Frege, the basis for mean-
ing as expressed in language is an awareness based only on perception and 
action. This awareness is also refl ected in our understanding of referential 
expressions, including proper names.
 It is true that forms of (perceptual and actional) practice, represented 
in the ways of givenness through which the world presents itself to us, 
get incorporated in the sign systems that languages constitute. But that 
is not the same as saying that sign systems are constitutive of meaning, 
understood as our awareness of or relationship with the world. Language 
comes afterwards, as a post-hoc phenomenon. This means that linguistic 
expressions at the basic level are precisely what Saussure denied (Saussure 
1983 [1916]: 75): purely labels for externally given meanings, rather than 
autonomous entities.
 Russell’s concept of ’logical proper names’ as being purely referential 
expressions is valid only as a theoretical, formal construction – an operation 
in a logical calculus with no conceptual content. If thoughts are to have 
conceptual substance, they must refl ect the world as it presents itself to us 
in perception and action. That is what Frege’s theory of ‘the thought’ has 
taught us: The thought is not a linguistic construct. Thoughts are basically 
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constituted by our awareness of the world as it presents itself to us in 
perception and action. 
 Unfortunately, Frege views his thoughts as part of an objective ‘third 
realm’ besides the empirical world, which is reminiscent of Plato’s world 
of ideas. Frege’s motivation for this is his desire to avoid ’psychologism’, 
i.e. the view that thoughts and logic are subject to the vagaries of the 
empirical world. As a response to psychologism, this appears, however, to 
be an extreme reaction. To conceive of logic as an empirical process is of 
course not appropriate. But instead of setting up an ideal world apart from 
the world of the senses, we can take our point of departure in what may 
be called ’normative phenomenology’. Essential from this point of view 
is the realization that human awareness as based on perception and action 
contains an inherently refl exive aspect. What this entails can be spelled 
out in the form of ’principles’ or ‘maxims’ that underlie, or are taken for 
granted, in the way we understand the empirical world.  
 The level at which such principles belong has been addressed in 
various ways through the history of philosophy (e.g., by Kant, Heidegger, 
Grice and Habermas), and it would take us beyond the scope of this paper 
to discuss it further here.2 For the purposes of the argument above, the 
following three principles are basic: 
WE ACT IN THE AWARENESS THAT WE CAN DO THINGS RIGHT 
OR WRONG IN RELATION TO OUR INTENTIONS
(the normative point of departure)
GOAL-DIRECTED ACTION REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD
(causal prerequisites as criteria of appropriate action) 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE WORLD IS AVAILABLE VIA 
PERCEPTION, PROVIDING ‘WAYS OF GIVENNESS’ 
(truth can be assessed and structured via reference and predication)
 
All this we have to presuppose as a necessary part of our ‘being-in-the 
world’. A house can be viewed from different directions – but this does not 
mean that the house itself is merely the sum of these perspectives. Rather, 
based on our co-ordination of these perspectives, the causally accessible 
world is gradually appearing as an objective reality – as Venus has come 
2 For a more extensive discussion of some of these matters cf. Widell (2009). 
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to be the objective astronomical object it is, as a result of co-ordinating the 
evening and the morning perspectives (‘ways of givenness’).
 All this presupposes perception – otherwise we would act ‘blindly’ 
(which really means not being able to act at all). But action additionally 
presupposes the organisation of information so as to make reference and 
predication possible, thus enabling the assessment of truth. And fi nally, 
the link with meaning as related to language arises when we take the step 
towards assertion, communicating propositions (based on thoughts) as 
being true. 
 At this point, via the crucial link of assertion, meanings enter into the 
realm of linguistic conventions. Such conventions, as organized into a 
language system, are what enables us to build up and share all the specifi c 
conceptual meanings as part of the complex interactional processes that 
depend essentially on the availability of meanings that are not always 
directly anchored in perceptions ‘as they are given to us’. 
II. Functional semantics
4. The assertion in an evolutionary context
The assertion also has a crucial status in a functional perspective, if 
functionality is viewed in the context of an evolutionary pattern of thinking 
– as it must be, in a modern version of functionalism. To show why this is 
so requires a number of steps, beginning with an account of what is meant 
by the term ‘functional’.
 As pointed out above, functional semantics differs from semantics 
as conceived within the Saussurean, structuralist paradigm, by taking its 
point of departure in what speakers can do with language – hence also in 
a perspective which sees language as anchored in a wider world beyond 
language itself. It also differs from the purely cognitive perspective on 
semantics, in which the human mind is viewed as the sole and privileged 
context in which language belongs. This is not to say that the functional 
perspective does not view language as belonging in a cognitive context – 
rather, it views also cognition as belonging in a wider, functional context.
 Functionalism in an informal, intuitive sense has been part of linguistics 
since Aristotle. However, while the tradition from Aristotle could allow 
itself to assume that things in nature had inherent functions (so that one 
could explain the presence of sharp teeth in a lion by reference to the 
fact that it was a beast of prey), this assumption is untenable in a modern 
scientifi c world view. 
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In an evolutionary perspective, functions arise, cf. Wright (1973), when 
an organ or tool has causal powers (effects) that contribute to keeping the 
system to which it belongs in existence. With the beast of prey example, 
sharp teeth contribute by enabling the lion to kill its prey, thereby allowing 
it to survive and reproduce. This in turn ensures that there will be lions 
around also in the next generation. It is this two-step causal relationship 
that qualifi es as a defi nition of ‘function’ that can play a role in scientifi c 
explanations of how biological features can arise, cf. also Allen, Bekoff & 
Lauder (1998). 
 Note that this double causality is not limited to biological entities. 
It also applies to artefacts, e.g. screwdrivers: they contribute to human 
practices by making it possible to have objects around that need to be fi xed 
by screws, and this in turn is what makes us keep screwdrivers around.
 Teeth from beasts of prey also have other uses, e.g. as means of 
payment, but that is not what keeps beasts of prey in business, hence not 
what causes the teeth themselves to be reproduced from generation to 
generation. Thus the function of an object (in this privileged evolutionary 
sense of the word) is not just any effect or causal power – only that which 
contributes to reproducing the system of which it forms part from generation 
to generation. Hence, functions depend on a complex causal relation that 
can only arise in systems that depend on reproduction for their continued 
existence. The Atlantic Ocean therefore does not have a function in the 
evolutionary sense – it just stays around, whatever uses it may have.   
 How this view of functions applies to language in general is a question 
that cannot be addressed here, but cf. Harder (1996); only a few crucial 
applications can be pointed out. One concerns the question of whether the 
function of language is essentially to do with communication or with the 
structuring of thought – an issue that has tended to divide the generative 
from the functionalist camp, cf. Givón (1993), Jackendoff (1994), Knight 
et al. (2000). 
The combined approach in this paper illustrates why this is a pseudo-
question. The question of whether thought or communication is most 
essential presupposes that the two are necessarily in competition; but 
there is no reason to assume that it is not a combination of both. Starting 
from the functional perspective, we can say that whatever the functional 
role of thought may be in relation to language, in terms of the approach 
to function described above there can be no serious discussion about 
whether communication is crucial. Language could not be a feature of the 
human world unless it was transmitted from generation to generation via 
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communication. Regardless of the contribution of genetic factors, no one 
to our knowledge has claimed that language acquisition would be possible 
without linguistic communication, cf. Harder (1996: 99).
 Having established that communication is necessary to keep languages 
around, let us turn to the role of thoughts. If we view human languages in 
the context of evolutionary history, after attempts to establish continuity 
between animal and human communication (cf. Pinker 1994), it has 
become generally accepted that there remains a clear break between human 
linguistic abilities and those of even the most successful trained apes. For 
the purposes of this paper, we shall point to two aspects of what this break 
consists in. 
 One aspect is the rise of context-independent, mental meanings. Pre-
human forms of communication, cf. Deacon (1997), are anchored directly 
in the situational environment, and human languages are thus unique in 
possessing purely symbolic, situation-detachable meanings. Thus alarm 
calls, cf. Cheney and Seyfarth (1992), are triggered by a danger (e.g., a 
leopard), present in the situation – not by a leopard that is only part of 
the sender’s mental world. With a rough but illustrative exaggeration, this 
makes animal communication in principle subject to stimulus control, 
thus potentially to a behaviourist approach. Meanings in such systems of 
communication are basically in the environment, not in the mind.
 Human languages, in contrast, are distinguished by the presence of 
purely mental, i.e. conceptual meanings, distilled from but not directly 
triggered by relations with the environment (along with surviving features 
shared with animal calls, e.g. ouch as an expression of immediate pain). 
The meaning of the word leopard is not inherently associated with a 
situationally present specimen. The rise of conceptual meaning is thus part 
of the history of evolution. Before a certain point in evolution, meanings of 
the kind that are characteristic of human languages did not exist. 
 If we go back to the role of thoughts in Frege’s account, evolutionary 
history can thus offer to supply the background. Before the rise of the ability 
to entertain meanings independently of direct environmental triggers, 
it would not be possible to operate with the core elements in his theory, 
including the formation of thoughts that could be evaluated as either true or 
false: a false thought must by defi nition be one without something to match 
it in the environment.
 While purely mental meanings are necessary to enable the formation 
of thoughts in the sense assumed by the tradition, including Frege, they 
are not in themselves suffi cient. An inventory of concepts including for 
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instance leopard, kill, and prey would not in itself contain anything that 
could be either true or false. We also need to combine these meanings 
into thoughts with assertible content and describe what role such assertible 
thoughts may have in the human world. We therefore need to look at the 
second aspect of the crucial evolutionary step forward that is associated 
with human language.
 This step was described by Tomasello (2008) as involving the capacity 
for joint attention and action. This capacity involves a number of things, 
cf. Harder (2010: 75f), but especially it requires that human beings can 
relate to each other in two ways: (1) by attending to the same thing; (2) by 
attending to it not because of its inherent interest from a purely individual 
point of view, but because of the interest it gets by virtue of human subjects 
attending to it together. 
This sense of ‘togetherness’ creates a new status for the object of 
attention – and this may also cause people to persist even in activities with 
no apparent goal (Tomasello 2008: 177–78). This engagement in ‘being 
in this together’ goes with a species-specifi c form of altruistic orientation, 
cf. Warneken & Tomasello (2006), towards shared rather than purely 
individual access to environmental affordances. 
 What this means is that human beings are unique in fi nding it 
worthwhile to share thoughts with no immediate environmental payoff. 
With this, we are back at the crucial status of the assertion. The assertion 
is the basic formula that allows the formation of complex meanings that 
constitute communicated thoughts. 
 The appropriateness of this contextualization of assertions as a 
design feature of human communication can be supported by reference 
to the fi nding that one thing that language-trained apes have never been 
recorded as doing spontaneously is to produce purely declarative, assertive 
statements. In a pre-human world it is not obvious what enhanced selective 
fi tness would be achieved by providing unsolicited information for free. 
From the recipient’s perspective, in terms of the pre-human animal world 
there is no apparent role for paying attention to what fellow subjects might 
want to say about the world – no way for it to be ecologically appropriate 
to make such utterances. Only in the human world where ‘being in it 
together’ has a value in itself does it make sense to share your thoughts. 
Tomasello has produced a wealth of experimental evidence illustrating this 
feature of human interaction (examples can be found on YouTube!).
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5. The evolutionary rise of content substance
Assertions, as pointed out above, depend on structuring and combining 
human, conceptual meanings in particular ways. From the point of view of 
linguistic semantics, this raises the question of how this evolutionarily and 
philosophically central type of complex sign fi ts into a general theory of 
meaning as a property of language. 
 Some basic features can be illustrated by going back to the primeval 
stage of the rise of human languages. This rise of conventional meaning 
must involve a basic step by which certain overt actions (which may have 
been gestural rather than vocal at the fi rst stage, cf. Tomasello (2008)) 
became associated with a content that made it relevant to re-use particular 
actions for conveying that particular content. This instantiates the two-step 
causal relation associated with evolutionary functions: the effect of using 
such a sign is what causes speakers to reproduce utterances of which they 
form part. When this happens, languages can arise and persist by the same 
causal mechanism that drives other evolutionary processes.
 But we may follow the pathway stipulated by Frege in arguing that this 
step must be preceded by an even more fundamental step, which is directly 
linked to the rise of joint attention and action: Before signs can come into 
being, there must be shared, communicable meaning. It makes no sense 
to try to invoke a kind of meaning that is not available to the designated 
addressees. Where animal signals or calls can rely for their effi cacy on a 
shared environment, signs with conceptual meaning can only operate in an 
environment where there is already an emerging pool of shared conceptual 
meaning. 
 From this it follows that at the pre-linguistic stage of language 
phylogeny, shared attention and action must have engendered a resource of 
jointly available mental content among members of the pioneer community. 
In the pre-human world, individuals can possess a rich mental world – 
but such mental worlds are strictly private; a pool of shareable meaning 
is a new evolutionary phenomenon. As discussed above, Frege posits a 
quasi-Platonic ‘third realm’ to provide a location for meanings, in order 
to avoid the vagaries of individual empirical psychology. In the picture 
outlined here, what underpins the status of meanings as being irreducible 
to individual psychology is not a realm of ideas, but the presence of shared, 
co-ordinated meaning creation in the community. It is the obligatory 
embedding of meaning in a shared set of norms that underpins the ‘normative 
phenomenology’ described above. Content substance constitutes meaning 
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that is endowed with human communicability, and thus available for 
potential encoding, but viewed in abstraction from particular alternative 
ways of communicating it by means of linguistic signs. 
 Like all evolutionary innovations, content substance is not wholly new 
– it piggybacks on what was there before, i.e. individual mental content. 
But the innovative step from individual to shared content is essential for 
human languages to arise – with the word cow as an example, unless we 
could entertain the meaning ‘cow’ as a shared idea, human language would 
not be viable as an evolutionary innovation. Moreover, once we possess a 
universe of shared meaning, it can accommodate semantic material that 
could not arise via the royal road of individual perception and action, 
including the meanings of words like unicorn, phlogiston and quidditch. 
 The role of sharedness as opposed to direct relations with the surrounding 
world also for quite mundane types of meanings can be illustrated by the 
way one learned to fi nd one’s way round the Nicaraguan capital Managua 
in 1997. At the time, all directions were given by reference to a point of 
orientation called ‘the yellow cinema’, a choice which was rather opaque 
for newcomers, since the cinema in question had been swallowed up by the 
ground in a major earthquake several years previously. But once familiar 
with the site on which it had stood, newcomers learned to adapt their 
geographical orientation around the yellow cinema, too. 
 The functional point of view agrees with the formal point of view 
that meaning is not inherent in the linguistic sign (pace the Saussurean 
tradition). But unlike the referential tradition, functionalism assigns 
an essential role to human subjects in the picture. It is because human 
subjects have evolved to understand the world in particular ways, and do 
it as a community rather than as individuals, that not purely individual and 
idiosyncratic meaning becomes available – and hence offers the possibility 
of conventionalization. Without the previous rise of content substance, 
conventional linguistic meanings would not be conceivable.
6. Assertions in a functional and structural perspective
As the last point in this discussion of where referential and functional 
semantics meet, we shall now offer what can only be a very sketchy account 
of the way assertions, as a key issue, are intertwined in a semantics based 
on linguistic structure. 
We saw above that functional linguistics, like referential semantics, 
differed from the Saussurean tradition in viewing meaning as anchored in 
the world outside language itself. While a functional approach is sometimes 
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viewed as antithetical to a structural approach, the Danish (and also more 
generally the European) functional tradition is based on the assumption that 
structures are function-based. This means that we can only understand how 
complex linguistic signs are structured if we simultaneously understand 
what functions individual elements have in relation to each other as well as 
in relation to the communication of which they form part.
 In a strand of the European tradition, cf. Foley & Van Valin (1984), 
Dik (1989), Harder (1996), Engberg-Pedersen et al. (2005), Hengeveld 
& Mackenzie (2008), Engberg-Pedersen et al. (2019) clause structure has 
been analysed in terms of the so-called ‘layered structure’. This model 
constitutes a hierarchical organization of meanings of different types and 
embodies important cross-linguistic regularities that have counterparts 
also in generative linguistics, cf. Siewierska (1992). A key feature is that 
this hierarchy is broadly divisible, cf. Searle (1969: 122) into a formula 
for speech acts F(R,P), with an illocutionary force taking scope over a 
proposition that is constituted by a referential and a predicational part. 
The difference is that a whole range of other linguistic expressions and 
categories provide differentiated microstructure around this major division.
 Not all utterance meanings refl ect this structure. An important 
exception is the type of utterances that constitute whole interactive acts, 
e.g., greetings like hello and exclamations like hurrah! Their meanings 
consist in acts that feed directly into human interaction without involving 
propositional content. Hence, they are not obviously addressable in terms 
of formal, referential semantics; they have no obvious ‘thought content’. 
This should not unduly perturb proponents of the referential approach. 
Such acts, while being conveyed by conventional human signs, may 
be regarded as marginal when it comes to the design features of human 
language – although they enter into human languages, they are analogous 
to signals in animal communication by virtue of their direct links with the 
ongoing situational interaction. 
 Assertions, however, do refl ect this structural division, also in a 
linguistic analysis: They have a propositional core, divisible into a 
referential and a predicational subpart – and they also, at the top of the 
hierarchy, involve what Frege calls a ‘judgment’. In terms of the tradition of 
functional linguistics, this judgment belongs in a structural slot designated 
for illocutionary operators. 
 In the linguistic tradition, the meanings of these operators have to be 
pared down to what is strictly conventional, which creates a difference with 
the philosophical sense of ‘illocution’, cf. Engberg-Pedersen et al. (2019: 
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270). Thus, an assertion in the structural-linguistic sense corresponds 
to what is traditionally called the ‘declarative’. This means that it is not 
necessarily very assertive, but may also have more tentative readings. The 
similarity, however, is strong enough to justify the claim that there is an 
essential relation; there is a paradigmatic relation between declaratives and 
interrogatives, as exemplifi ed in the pair he is coming/is he coming? such 
that the declarative conveys a commitment to the truth of the proposition, 
while the interrogative does not. Thus, we may assume that a Fregean 
‘judgment’ is conventionally encoded by means of the declarative operator 
(signalled, in the example, by means of constituent order).
 Also, we may choose to regard the two elements of propositional 
meaning, reference and predication, as inherently functional (propositional 
acts, in Searle’s terminology, cf. Searle (1969: 24), and also in the linguistic 
tradition, cf. Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008). Reference, as recognized 
since Strawson (1950), is a function that we may achieve by means of 
linguistic expressions, and only if that function is achieved, is the relation 
with the referent established. 
 Under this interpretation, functional clause structure can thus naturally 
accommodate the elements that are essential in a Fregean truth-conditional 
semantics. In addition, a functional analysis can throw additional light on 
the structural build-up of assertions, understood in this context as complex 
linguistic signs rather than un-encoded thought content. 
 What is more, the specifi cally referential properties of linguistic 
expressions need to be supported by semantic properties that are not in 
themselves referential, also in order to account for their role in bringing 
about assertions. I have argued elsewhere, cf. Harder (1976, 2009) that 
defi niteness can be illuminatingly captured in an analysis that highlights the 
functional-interactive dimension of meaning. If we consider defi niteness 
as constituting the meaning of the defi nite article the, we can use it to 
illustrate what a functional semantics can add to Russell’s reference-
oriented description.
 Under this approach, what the (as opposed to the indefi nite article a) 
conventionally signals is an interactive instruction to identify a particular 
referent as being talked about. If you say give me the book!, the addressee 
has not complied with the instruction unless he has identifi ed the right 
book – in contrast to what is the case if the indefi nite article had been 
used, as in a book. This is fully compatible with Russell’s (1905) theory, 
because identifi cation implies pointing to the one and only object for 
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which the phrase the book stands. The conventional meaning ascribed to 
the defi nite article in this analysis stands directly on the shoulders of ‘joint 
attention’ as a crucial evolutionary innovation. Only speakers possessing 
this capacity can meaningfully ask each other to enter into a relationship of 
joint attention to a particular referent in order to share information about it.
Russell’s analysis captures the referential aspect and its entanglement 
with the existence-and-uniqueness implications, as well as the falseness 
(the lack of fi t with the real world) of statements about the Golden 
Mountain. What it does not capture is the interactive weirdness of 
statements about non-existing objects (as opposed to statements denying 
or asserting their existence). That weirdness emerges straightforwardly 
from assuming that the encodes an instruction-to-identify (and hence the 
whole presuppositional aspect): asking people to do something with a non-
existing object (whether to identify, to fetch, or to destroy it, etc.) is clearly 
deviant.
 This interactive link is essential to create an actual assertion with a 
truth value. You cannot tell whether the book is illustrated in colour is true 
or false, unless you have identifi ed the book in question. This identifi cation 
is an interactive operation which cannot be captured in terms of what the 
world is like. It is neither a thought nor a constituent of a thought, but an 
act that anchors the thought to the world to which it applies. At the next 
level, going upwards from the structure of a referring expression to the role 
of reference itself, reference along with predication and assertion can be 
anchored in structural-functional account of how conventional meanings 
hang together. The functional and structural dimensions do not contradict 
the formal-semantic description, but provide it with a context that is beyond 
its own focal area of interest. 
7. Summary and fi nal comments
We have tried to argue that there are signifi cant overlapping elements in 
the two approaches to meaning, and that the essential difference between 
them lies in what the aim of the description is. While the formal-semantic, 
truth-conditional tradition aims to account for meaning in relation to the 
world that statements are about, functional (-structural) semantics aims 
to describe meaning as a property of human languages. Both approaches 
go beyond structuralism in accounting for meaning as part of a wider 
world beyond the language system itself. In truth-conditional semantics, 
the essential relations with the surrounding world are reference and truth; 
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in functional semantics, the essential relation is the function linguistic 
expressions have in enabling shared conceptualization between speakers 
as part of maintaining interactive relations. 
  Some elements of human languages fall outside the scope of truth-
conditional semantics, because they are not essentially concerned with 
propositional meanings that can be assigned a truth value. However, these 
holophrastic elements (hello, hurrah!, fuck!) are arguably not central to 
what human languages are about.
 Other, more interesting elements (the examples are ‘declarative’ 
and defi niteness) cannot in themselves be captured fully by their truth-
conditional properties. However, they have an essential role in accounting 
for how assertions – the truth-conditionally central type of utterances – 
come to apply to those situations in the world that they are about. The 
‘judgment’ that is central to Fregean semantics fi ts into a functional 
semantics in which we have illocutionary meanings at the top of the 
hierarchy, in the periphery above the central proposition: reference and 
predication constitute functions that if achieved, bring about the proposition 
that constitutes the content of the assertion; and fi nally, defi niteness is an 
interactive signal that requires the addressee to bring about the referential 
relationship without which truth values cannot be assigned. 
 The semantic properties that are fundamental to truth-conditional 
semantics can thus without contradiction be fi tted into a structural-
functional semantics, where they enter into paradigmatic relations 
(assertion ~ declarative has a paradigmatic opposition to the interrogative, 
and defi niteness has a paradigmatic opposition to indefi niteness) and 
syntagmatic relations (e.g., with operators such as discourse markers) that 
are not essential to the concerns of truth-conditional semantics.
 Just as a referential semantics cannot account for the whole area of 
linguistic semantics, a linguistic semantics cannot account for those parts 
of referential semantics that apply to features independent of linguistic 
coding. The use of formal, logical semantics as a skeleton structure 
underlying mathematical structure lies outside the purview of linguistic 
semantics. But if there is clarity both about the areas of overlap and the 
areas of divergence, an integrated perspective on the two approaches can 
enrich our understanding of the role and nature of conceptual meaning. 
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